

The AI Displacement Paradox

Repricing Is Not Rescue

Historical automation displaced some workers while increasing demand for certain complementary human capabilities. Whether generative AI reproduces that pattern is unresolved, and the newest evidence complicates both the optimistic and the pessimistic reading. Even if the pattern holds, a market premium for a capability is not income, access, or protection for a displaced worker. That distinction is the paper. The displacement evidence leads, because a firm that sells capacity formation has no business stating the complementarity half loudly and the displacement half quietly.

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The Central Proposition

Automation can increase demand for human capabilities that complement the technology while displacing workers whose jobs contain substitutable tasks. The gains and the losses are unevenly distributed and do not automatically reach the same people. A market premium for a capability is not income for a person who has just lost their job.

Executive Brief

- Industrial robots displaced employment in exposed U.S. labor markets, and the effect was measured rather than argued. Acemoglu and Restrepo found robust negative effects of industrial robots across US commuting zones: one more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.42 percent.
- Automation can also raise the value of complementary human work. Autor argues that the interplay of machine and human comparative advantage allows computers to substitute for workers in routine, codifiable tasks while amplifying the comparative advantage of workers in problem-solving, adaptability, and creativity — and that commentators routinely overstate substitution while ignoring complementarity.
- A repricing has been visible in occupational composition for decades. Deming found that between 1980 and 2012, jobs requiring high levels of social interaction grew by nearly 12 percentage points as a share of the US labor force, while math-intensive but less social jobs — including many STEM occupations — shrank by 3.3 percentage points, with employment and wage growth strongest where both math and social skill requirements were high. “Social skills” there is an O*NET task-intensity measure, not the Emotional Portfolio™, and Section VII states why the two must not be conflated.
- These are not competing findings. The populations may overlap, but the gains and losses are not automatically distributed to the same workers. The relative price of non-automatable human capacity rises while particular workers are displaced, and those two facts describe different populations.
- And the case for building capacity does not require pretending displacement is imaginary. Any argument that leans on that pretence is both false and cruel, and Section VI lists five uses of this argument that EQGenix refuses.

A Note on Method

This paper follows the EQGenix evidentiary standard. Every citation was verified against its primary source before publication. Limitations are disclosed inline at the point of claim. Correlational and quasi-experimental findings are never described as though they were experimental. The strongest available evidence against the thesis is engaged by name.

Claims are labeled by evidence class throughout: ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE for peer-reviewed economic research; REPORTED DATA for institutional data collection that has not undergone peer review; and EQGENIX ARGUMENT for the firm's own reasoning, which is argument rather than evidence.

This paper is a labor economics paper. It asks what happens to the price of human capacity when machines become capable. It does not revisit the question of whether AI use erodes judgment, which is the subject of White Paper 001, and the two should not be read as versions of each other.

Read This First If Your Job Is Being Automated

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

A paper arguing that human capacity is becoming more valuable will be read by people whose livelihood is presently being automated. They are owed four sentences before the argument starts.

- Displacement is not exaggerated, not temporary in any way this paper can promise, and not your fault. The estimates in Section I are among the most carefully identified in this literature, and they are negative.
- A rising relative price for a capacity is a statement about markets, not about desert. Nothing here implies that a displaced worker lacked capacity, failed to adapt, or should have chosen differently.
- Formation is not a substitute for income support, transition assistance, or industrial policy. It operates on one variable among many, and the others are outside this firm's competence and outside its lane.
- EQGenix has a direct commercial interest in the conclusion that capacity is worth building. That interest is disclosed here, again in Section IX, and in the research protocol.

I. Industrial Robots Displaced Employment in Exposed U.S. Labor Markets

ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE

The strongest evidence in this literature runs against the optimistic reading, and it belongs first rather than in a counterargument section.

Acemoglu and Restrepo studied the effects of industrial robots on US labor markets, estimating local impacts from variation in exposure defined by industry-level advances in robotics and local industry employment. They found robust negative effects of robots on employment and wages across commuting zones. Areas most exposed after 1990 showed no differential pre-trends, and the effect was distinguishable from other capital and technologies, from Chinese and Mexican import competition, from the decline of routine jobs, and from offshoring. Their headline estimate: one more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.42 percent.

Limitation disclosed at point of claim: this is a quasi-experimental design using an instrumental-variables strategy, not a randomized experiment, and the estimates depend on the validity of that instrument. The working-paper version reported a range — roughly 0.18 to 0.34 percentage points on employment and 0.25 to 0.5 percent on wages — and the published point estimates sit inside it. Most importantly for this paper, the study concerns industrial robots: tangible, rivalrous capital installed in specific plants. Generative AI is intangible and non-rivalrous, and treating the robot estimates as a forecast for AI is a false analogy that this paper does not make.

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

That finding should be the first thing anyone selling adaptation reads, which is why it is the first thing in this paper. Displacement is not a rhetorical device deployed by pessimists. It has been identified, bounded, and separated from competing explanations by researchers with no interest in alarming anyone. Any account of automation that cannot hold this finding is not an account worth having.

II. Automation Can Increase the Value of Complementary Human Work

ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE

And yet employment did not collapse. Autor's account of why is the standard reference and it turns on a distinction rather than an optimism.

Automation substitutes for labor, as it is intended to. But it also complements labor, raises output in ways that increase demand for labor, and interacts with adjustments in labor supply. Autor argues that journalists and expert commentators alike tend to overstate machine substitution and ignore the complementarities that raise productivity, earnings, and labor demand. His mechanism is comparative advantage: computers substitute for workers in routine, codifiable tasks while amplifying the comparative advantage of workers in supplying problem-solving skills, adaptability, and creativity.

He is not, however, describing a benign process. The same essay documents polarization — wage gains going disproportionately to the top and the bottom of the skill distribution rather than the middle — which is what displacement looks like when it is distributed unevenly rather than absolutely.

Limitation disclosed at point of claim: this is an interpretive essay in a review journal synthesizing a literature, not an empirical estimate, and it predates the generative AI period entirely. Autor himself has since hypothesized that AI may differ from robots in ways that could change the direction of polarization. His argument establishes that complementarity is a real and historically documented mechanism. It does not establish the size of that mechanism under any particular technology.

III. The Historical Market Rewarded Particular Combinations of Tasks

ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE

If complementarity operates, it should be visible in what the labor market pays for. It is.

Deming documented that between 1980 and 2012, jobs requiring high levels of social interaction grew by nearly 12 percentage points as a share of the US labor force, while math-intensive but less social jobs — including many STEM occupations — shrank by 3.3 percentage points. Employment and wage growth were particularly strong for jobs requiring high levels of both math skill and social skill. He models this as team production in which workers trade tasks to exploit comparative advantage, and in which social skills lower coordination costs, permitting specialization. He also notes that the growth in social-skill-intensive occupations occurred throughout the wage distribution rather than only in low-skilled service work.

*Limitation disclosed at point of claim: this is an occupational-composition and wage analysis using task measures from O*NET and cohort data from the NLSY, not an experiment, and it identifies association rather than establishing*

that any individual's social skill caused their wage. The period ends in 2012 and therefore predates generative AI. Deming himself notes that offshoring, trade, and the shift toward services can partially explain these trends. And "social skills" as operationalized there is not the same construct as anything EQGenix sells, a point Section VII returns to.


EQGENIX ARGUMENT

The direction is what makes this the most useful finding in the paper, and it is the opposite of what a generation of career advice assumed. The occupations that shrank were the technical, low-interaction ones — the jobs everyone was told were automation-proof. The occupations that grew were those requiring the coordination of other human beings. That is a price signal about which human capacities the market has been rewarding, and it was visible well before the current wave of AI.

IV. The Paradox Resolved

TWO TRUE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE SAME TECHNOLOGY

The paradox is not that one side is wrong. It is that the capacity whose price rises and the worker whose job disappears are frequently not the same person.



This is an argument about relative prices, not about who deserves what. Section VI states what this paper refuses to justify.

EQGenix Inc. · White Paper 007 · Figure 1 · Research Edition v1.4

Figure 1. Two true statements about the same technology, and the population difference that reconciles them.

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

Set the three findings side by side and the contradiction dissolves into something harder: a distributional fact.

The unit that gets displaced is a worker, whose income depends on a particular bundle of tasks in a particular place. Market prices attach to jobs, tasks, and observable capability signals; capacities themselves are held by people, as White Paper 002 argues at length. The gap is that a rising market valuation reaches a person only through employment, bargaining power, credible evidence of the capability, and access to a labor market that prices it — and a worker in a commuting zone that lost its plant may hold the capability and none of the four.

Nothing about the historical growth of social-task-intensive work, or the theoretical complementarity of problem-solving, adaptability, and creativity, reaches a displaced worker automatically. Note the levels: Deming measured occupational task intensity, not any individual's capacity, and Autor discusses complementary capabilities without supplying a price estimate for that bundle. Moving from either to a claim about the price of judgment would be a category error, and this paper does not make it.

"Human capacity is more valuable than ever" is at best a claim about aggregate demand and at worst a slogan. Either way it is not a statement about a person's income. Any firm using the first to imply the second is selling a story rather than a service.

This is why the popular version of this argument is only half a thesis. Automation does raise the price of human capacity. It does not follow that automation is good for humans, that displaced workers will benefit, or that automation is a sufficient response. Those are three separate claims and this paper makes none of them.

V. Nobody Knows Where the New Boundary Sits

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

Every historical reassurance in this literature rests on technologies that automated physical and routine cognitive tasks. Three differences make extrapolation risky in both directions, and honesty requires naming them rather than selecting the ones that suit.

Generative systems are non-rivalrous. A robot is installed in one plant and works one shift. A model is copied at near-zero marginal cost and is available everywhere at once, which means diffusion may be faster and the adjustment period shorter than any prior wave — a point that cuts against the reassuring reading.

The exposed tasks are different. Prior automation displaced routine work, which is what produced the hollowing of the middle that Autor documents. Current systems perform non-routine cognitive work — drafting, summarizing, analysis, first-pass judgment — which is the category the complementarity argument previously assigned to humans. If the boundary of "what machines cannot do" moves, the capacities on the safe side of it change, and this paper should not pretend to know where the new boundary sits.

And the direction is genuinely contested. Autor has hypothesized that AI may differ from robots in ways that could reverse wage polarization rather than deepen it. That is a hypothesis about the future from one of the field's most careful analysts, and it is offered here as an open question rather than as support.

REPORTED DATA

One recent study bears directly on the question and complicates both readings. Humlum and Vestergaard linked large-scale adoption surveys to administrative labor market records in Denmark, where take-up rates are comparable to the United States. They document rapid adoption — most employers in exposed occupations had launched chatbot initiatives within two years of ChatGPT's release, workers reported productivity benefits, and new AI-related tasks were widespread. And they estimate precise null effects on earnings and recorded hours at both worker and workplace level, ruling out effects larger than 2 percent two years after launch. What moved was the structure of work: task reorganization, new tasks in content generation and AI oversight, and adopters transitioning into higher-paying occupations, though too few to shift average earnings.

Limitation disclosed at point of claim: this is an NBER working paper, not yet peer-reviewed, covering one country over roughly two years. A precise null at two years is not a forecast for ten, and the authors' own framing is that reorganization absorbs change before it surfaces in economic statistics. It is cited here because it is the most direct current evidence available and because it cuts against the pessimistic and optimistic readings equally — which is the honest state of this question.

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

Disclosure at point of claim: the three points above are arguments rather than findings. No study cited in this paper establishes the diffusion rate, the task boundary, or the distributional direction of generative AI. Anyone claiming to know these things at present is forecasting, and should say so.

VI. Five Things This Argument Will Not Be Used For

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

The argument in Sections II and III is routinely conscripted for purposes it cannot support. A firm that benefits from the argument should be the one to shut those uses down, so here they are.

- It does not justify inaction on displacement. That the market rewards non-automatable capacity says nothing about what is owed to a worker whose plant closed, and complementarity is not a policy.
- It does not justify telling a displaced worker to reskill. Section I's estimates are local and structural; an individual exhortation is not a response to a commuting-zone effect, and treating it as one relocates a structural problem onto the person least able to solve it.
- It does not justify employers reducing training investment on the theory that capacity is now the worker's problem. The complementarity argument, if anything, points the other way.
- It does not justify EQGenix, or anyone else, marketing formation as insurance against displacement. Formation has no demonstrated employment effect in any population, and selling it as protection would be a claim the evidence cannot carry.
- And it does not justify the inference that people who kept their jobs had more capacity. Selection, geography, industry, and timing explain a great deal of who was exposed, and moral readings of employment outcomes are not supported by anything in this literature.

VII. What Would Have to Be Built, and What EQGenix Has Not Built

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

If the price signal in Section III is real, a formation response has to clear four conditions before it deserves to be taken seriously. EQGenix clears none of them yet, and says so here rather than waiting to be asked.

- It must target capacities that are plausibly on the non-automatable side of the boundary, while acknowledging that the boundary is moving and that no one knows where it will settle.
- It must produce evidence a labor market can read. A capacity that cannot be evidenced to an employer earns no return regardless of whether the person holds it, which is the same translation problem described in White Paper 005.
- It must distinguish its construct from the ones the economic literature already measures. Deming's "social skills" is an O*NET task-intensity measure derived from occupational task ratings, not a measure of any individual's capacity, and not the Emotional Portfolio™. Citing his wage findings as evidence for a proprietary construct set would be a category error. The lineage and redundancy tests carried in White Paper 003 apply here without modification, and the specific test for this paper is whether the Emotional Portfolio™ adds anything to a wage model that already contains O*NET task measures and standard controls.
- It must be reachable by the people the price signal does not reach on its own — which is a distribution problem, not a curriculum problem, and this firm has not solved it.

VIII. What Would Have to Be True

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

Four conditions would refute or narrow different parts of the position, and they do not all bear on the same thesis. None is discharged.

The historical trend must persist under generative AI. Deming's data end in 2012. If occupational and wage growth in social-task-intensive work flattens or reverses in the generative period, the paper's directional claim about which capabilities the market has rewarded is gone and should be withdrawn. That would weaken the historical claim; it would not by itself refute automation complementarity as a mechanism, which rests on a separate literature.

The capacities must be distinguishable from what the labor market already measures and prices. If the Emotional Portfolio™ is a relabeling of task-intensity measures already in O*NET, it adds nothing to a wage model.

Formation must move the capacity, and the capacity must move an employment outcome. Two links, both unestablished. Failure here would refute the commercial relevance of formation. It would not refute the labor-economic paradox in Sections I through IV, which stands or falls on other evidence entirely, and EQGenix should not be permitted to conflate the two when reporting results.

And the return must be reachable. If measured capacity gains produce no wage or placement effect for participants who lack access to labor markets that price them, then formation without access is an incomplete intervention and should be described as one.

IX. The Strongest Counterarguments

One: this is a comfortable story told by someone who sells the remedy

The objection: a firm selling capacity formation has arrived at the conclusion that capacity is becoming more valuable, and the coincidence should be treated as evidence of motivated reasoning rather than analysis.

The interest is real and is disclosed. Three structural answers are offered. The paper leads with the evidence against its own position rather than burying it. It states in Section VI that formation may not be marketed as insurance against displacement, which is the most commercially useful claim available and is forgone. And Section VIII names a condition — the price signal failing to persist under generative AI — that would require withdrawing the paper rather than revising it. Those are checks a motivated document would not install.

Two: the historical record does not transfer

The objection: Autor and Deming describe a period ending well before generative AI, and every reassuring mechanism they identify may fail when the automated tasks are cognitive rather than routine.

Conceded, and Section V makes the same argument at more length rather than resisting it. The honest position is that this paper establishes a historical pattern and a mechanism, not a forecast. A reader who concludes that the pattern will not hold is disagreeing with the paper's implicit bet, not with its evidence.

Three: the aggregate hides the person

The objection: occupational share and average wage growth are aggregates, and a worker in a specific town with a specific skill set experiences none of them. A paper that answers displacement with a composition statistic has changed the subject.

This lands, and it is the reason Section IV exists and the reason Figure 1 puts the population difference on the page rather than in a footnote. The aggregate is genuinely what the evidence measures, and the paper claims nothing about any individual's prospects.

Four: capacity language is the new bootstraps

The objection, and it is the sharpest: an argument that non-automatable human capacity is increasingly valuable functions, in practice, as a way of assigning responsibility for structural displacement to individuals who should build more of it.

The concern is legitimate and the mechanism is real — the same argument has served that purpose repeatedly. Section VI is written to make that use unavailable from this document, including the sentence that this paper does not justify telling a displaced worker to reskill. Whether a constraint written into a paper survives contact with a

slide deck is a fair doubt, and it is why the constraint is stated in the terms a critic would use rather than in terms flattering to the firm.

X. Governance Boundaries

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

- No EQGenix material may describe formation as protection against, or insurance for, job displacement. There is no evidence for that claim and it exploits fear.
- No EQGenix material may cite this paper in support of reducing employer training investment, public transition assistance, or income support.
- Capacity measures may not be used in redundancy selection, workforce reduction, or any decision about which workers to displace. A framework built on the premise that capacity is buildable cannot be used to decide who is disposable.
- Where formation is offered to workers under active displacement risk, participation is voluntary and results belong to the participant. No employer receives an individual profile. This prohibition is standing and non-waivable, and consent is not treated as sufficient, because consent offered by a worker who believes their job is at risk is not free and refusal itself becomes information. Employer-facing reporting is aggregate only, at or above a minimum cell size.
- The commercial interest disclosed in this paper is disclosed in every derivative work, presentation, and proposal drawn from it.

XI. Epistemic Firewall

EQGenix is a Christ-centered firm and does not disguise it. The firm's governing canon holds Scripture as its source of authority and treats empirical science as a corroborating witness rather than a competing one. That is a worldview commitment, declared rather than embedded, and it is not offered as evidence.

Nothing in Sections I through X depends on the reader sharing it. Every empirical claim is cited to peer-reviewed economics that any reviewer can verify and reject.

Where the worldview operates is in a prior commitment that shapes Section VI: that a person's worth is not set by their marginal product, and that an argument about relative prices must never be allowed to become an argument about who matters. That is a value commitment, not an empirical finding, and it is labeled as one.

XII. What This Paper Does Not Claim

- It does not claim that automation is good for workers, or that displacement is overstated. Section I finds the opposite and leads with it.

- It does not claim that robot estimates forecast the effects of generative AI. Those are different technologies with different economics, and the analogy is declined.
- It does not claim that the historical complementarity pattern will hold under generative AI. Section V says the direction is contested.
- It does not claim that Deming’s social-skill findings are evidence for the Emotional Portfolio™. They measure a different construct.
- It does not claim that formation produces any employment, wage, or retention outcome. No such evidence exists in any EQGenix program.
- It does not claim that individual capacity building is a sufficient response to structural displacement, and Section VI states that it is not.
- It does not claim that the occupational composition trend in Section III will continue. It ran to 2012, and Section VIII names its reversal as the condition that would require withdrawing this paper.
- It does not claim that a market premium for a capability necessarily reaches the people who hold it. Employment, bargaining power, observability, and access all sit between the two.
- It does not claim that any worker’s employment outcome reflects their capacity. Geography, industry, timing, and exposure explain a great deal of who was displaced, and moral readings of employment outcomes are not supported by anything in this literature.

XIII. Research Protocol

EQGENIX ARGUMENT

The empirical question this paper raises is narrower than the paper itself, and it is answerable.

The replication question. Deming's analysis ends in 2012. Extending the same task-intensity method through the generative period would establish whether social-skill-intensive occupational and wage growth persisted, flattened, or reversed. That analysis requires no EQGenix data, could be run by any labor economist, and would settle the first falsification condition in Section VIII. EQGenix commits to publishing its position unchanged if the extension runs against it.

The construct question, and it is harder than it first appears. O*NET measures operate at the occupational level while Emotional Portfolio™ scores would operate at the individual level, wages reflect geography, tenure, education, industry, and bargaining power, and people sort into occupations non-randomly. The design therefore has to be multilevel and prospective — individuals nested within occupations, firms, and labor markets, with controls pre-specified. Four questions must be separated rather than collapsed into one regression: whether the construct is valid, whether employers can observe it, whether the labor market returns it, and whether a person has access to jobs that price it. A null on wages would not establish that the construct is invalid; it could equally establish that institutions do not observe or reward it, and reporting the two as the same result would be a misuse of the study.

The intervention question. Only after those two would an employment-endpoint study be meaningful: prospective, with a comparison condition, and employment and wage outcomes rather than self-report. All three phases — replication, construct testing, and employment endpoints — are governed by the same conditions rather than only the last: ethics review before first administration, an external partner as data custodian and analyst, public pre-registration, missing-data handling specified in advance with complete-case analysis alone not accepted, clustering accounted for at the level of assignment, EQGenix's commercial interest disclosed in every registry entry and publication, and null or disconfirming results reported and submitted on the same timetable and with the same effort as supportive ones.

XIV. Responsible Employer and Policy Action

An employer, workforce board, or policymaker should be able to act on this paper without buying anything.

- Do not treat the complementarity argument as a reason to do less for displaced workers. It is an observation about relative prices, not a transition plan.
- Conduct a current task-level exposure analysis rather than classifying whole workers or occupations as disposable. Distinguish task exposure from

displacement probability, include worker consultation, and do not use exposure or capacity scores for redundancy selection. A 1980–2012 occupational-composition finding is not a screening tool for a 2026 workforce, and using it as one would target people on an obsolete proxy.

- Ask any vendor selling adaptation whether they claim an employment effect, and ask for the study. In this field there generally is not one, including here.
- Never allow a capacity or readiness score to inform redundancy selection.
- Fund the follow-up that transition programs rarely include: where the people you displaced landed, and what they earn now. That is the outcome that answers whether any transition response worked, and it is routinely outside the reporting period.

*The market is repricing human capacity. It is not distributing it.
Anyone who confuses the two is selling reassurance, and reassurance
is not a plan.*

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Revision History

v1.0 (August 2026) — Initial Research Edition. Section I leads with the evidence against the paper's own direction. Inline limitation disclosures on the quasi-experimental identification, the robot-to-AI analogy, and Deming's data ending in 2012. Section VI states five things the argument does not justify; Section VIII states falsification conditions; Section X prohibits use of capacity measures in redundancy selection. v1.1 — Positional revision. v1.2 — Two superlatives bounded. v1.3 — Self-audit against the standard the other six papers reached, conducted before external review: a dismissive absolute removed, the repricing claim narrowed, the market-versus-desert boundary tightened, the Deming construct distinction made explicit, two items added to what the paper does not claim, and the employer disclosure provision replaced with the series-standard non-waivable prohibition. v1.4 (this edition) — Thirteen corrections following external review, one of them a live safety problem. The recommendation that employers look first at technical, low-interaction occupations in their own workforce is removed: it converted a 1980–2012 occupational-composition finding into a present-day exposure screen and could have led an employer to target people on an obsolete proxy. It is replaced with a task-level exposure analysis that distinguishes exposure from displacement probability, requires worker consultation, and prohibits use of exposure or capacity scores in redundancy selection. The Central Proposition claimed that the price of what a machine cannot do rises; that is not a general economic law — price depends on demand, supply, bargaining power, institutions, and observability — and it is rebuilt around demand for complementary capabilities and the uneven distribution of gains and losses. The deck becomes Repricing Is Not Rescue, since the previous version asserted a repricing not established for generative AI and an absolute that no one is rescued. The claim that the two findings concern different people is narrowed to the defensible version: the populations may overlap, but gains and losses are not automatically distributed to the same workers. A category error is corrected — capacities are held by people, as White Paper 002 argues, and it is market prices that attach to jobs, tasks, and observable signals. The leap from Deming's occupational task-intensity measures to the price of judgment, coordination, and adaptability is removed, with the levels-of-analysis problem stated explicitly. Three section headings are recalibrated so that one technology and one empirical design no longer stand for automation as a whole. Current generative-AI evidence is added: Humlum and Vestergaard's Danish administrative study, which documents rapid adoption, reported productivity benefits, and widespread new AI-related tasks alongside precise null effects on earnings and hours ruling out effects

larger than 2 percent at two years — cited as a working paper and as evidence that cuts against the optimistic and pessimistic readings equally. The falsification conditions now state what each would refute or narrow, with an explicit note that failure of formation to move employment outcomes would refute the commercial claim and not the labor-economic paradox. The construct study is rebuilt as a multilevel prospective design separating construct validity, employer recognition, labor-market return, and access, with a statement that a null on wages would not establish invalidity. Protocol conditions now govern all three phases rather than only the intervention phase. Three stale internal cross-references are updated to current editions.

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